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RES JUDICATA AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
JUDGMENTS
FREDERICK GREEN*

D

OES

THE entry of an invalid judgment, not appealed from,

make it res judicata between the parties that the judgment
is.valid, so that an action will lie to enforce it, or so that in another

action between them they will be treated as if the rights it pur)orts
to bring into existence really existed? The American Law Institute
in the most recent of its noteworthy contributions to legal literature, the Restatement of the Law of Judgments, says Yes, when
it is good policy to treat the invalid judgment as valid between the

parties, no, when it is not good policy to do so.'
,f considerations of policy are to determine how far a judgment
shall be treated as conclusive, it seems that inquiry should be
directed to the intention of the authorized deciders of policy, the
framers of the constitution and statute from which the court derived its power, and that, though legislative provisions may be
*Professor of Law, Emeritus, University oi Illinois Law School.
'Restatement: Judgments, Section 10. Res Judicata and Jurisdiction over
the Subject Matter. (1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and
determines that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying tle
doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the
court to act beyond its jurisdiction.
(2) Among the matters appropriate to be considered in determining that
collateral attack should be permitted are that
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of
law rather than of fact;
(c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction,
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;
-(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
See also Bennett Boskey and Robert Braucher, "Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack," 40 Columbia L. R. 1006, a well considered discussion which
reaches conclusions similar in general to those of the Restatement.
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interpreted in the light of policy, the question as to the effect of a
judgment should depend on the intent the lawmakers have mainfested as to what its effect should be.
In most cases the sole effect of a judgment, and in almost
all cases its most important effect, consists in its effect upon the
parties to it. Jurisdiction is given for the purpose of settling for
the parties their rights against each other. If in a given case the
legislators have deemed it good policy to withhold from a court
power to make a valid judgment, it would seem that by withholding the power they have manifested a determination that the
judgment shall not be treated as settling the rights between the
parties merely because it was made. Or, to put it conversely, if the
legislators intend that a judgment, if made, shall be effective between the parties, what reason have they for making it void as to
third persons whose interest was insufficient to give them standing to be made parties, and what reason can a court have for
imputing to the legislators an intent that it shall be void?' If the
Constitution or statutes are construed as intended to withhold from
a court power to determine the rights of the parties, it goes a
great way for judges to treat the judgment of that court as having
determined their rights on the ground that it is policy to make it
determinative of them.
According to the Restatement the validity, as between the
parties, of an invalid judgment results, when it does result, from
an application of a rule of res judicata. Res judicata is a rule of
evidence. It makes a decision as to fact in one case conclusive evidence of the fact in another case. It is an artificial rule and like
any artificial rule may be repealed by the makers of law If the
framers of a constitution have withheld from a court power to
take from a defendant a right or to impose on him a duty, it would
be strange to say that the legislature, though it cannot make the
judgment effective against him in favor of a third person, may
make it effective in favor of the plaintiff by saying that he shall
be estopped from telling the truth about it, because, instead of
-It may be granted that if a court enters judgment in the belief that it
has jurisdiction, its belief is as likely to be true as the belief of another court
that it had not. But if the second court is in error in thinking the first
judgment invalid, the error may be cured by appeal and there is no sufficient
reason why the appellate court should be bound by the decision of the first
trial court. And that the judgment of the first court is likely to be correct
would be as good a reason for holding it valid against all the world as for
holding it valid between the parties. The result of holding it valid would
be to give the court such power to make valid judgments as it reasonably
believed it had. That such jurisdiction is frequently conferred on courts, see
the cases cited infra, footnotes 26-30.
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appealing from it, he saw fit to exercise his privilege of ignoring
it. It is stranger still for a court to do so, and to do so when it
likes the result, and to refuse to do so when it doesn't like the result. Calling it an application of res judicata doesn't make it such.
To make a void judgment conclusive of its validity for the purpose
of enforcing a right it purports to give, is not to treat the judgment
as conclusive evidence of a fact. It is to make it in so far valid. It is
an alteration of substantive right masquerading as res judicata.
However there are decisions of the United States Supreme Court
that apply the phrase res judicata to the subject matter of judgments, which decisions are hard to interpret and to reconcile, and
the authors of the Restatement may well have thought it necessary
to reconcile them as best they could.
In Vallely v. Northern Fire Insurance Company,3 a corporation
alleged to be in the insurance business was adjudged to be an
involuntary bankrupt, although the bankruptcy act provided that
any moneyed corporation except an insurance company might be
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. The Supreme Court held that,
although the time for appeal.had gone by, the judgment must be
vacated on motion because it was a nullity. Congress obviously did
not intend to empower the court to put an insurance company into
involuntary bankruptcy, and so the court did not have power to
do so. It was immaterial that the question whether it did have
power arose under a law of the United States, that the court by
inadvertence or other error determined that it did have power, and
that the time for appeal had gone by Nothing in all that made it
res .judicata between the parties that the discharge was of any
effect.
In Kalb v. Feuerstctn,4 decided in January, 1940, it was held
on the same principle and without dissent that the decree of a
WVisconsin state court for the foreclosure of a mortgage on land,
made pending bankruptcy proceedings against a farmer who
owned it, was a nullity because an act of Congress forbade state
courts to maintain foreclosure suits pending such proceedings.
Hence it was concluded that neither the decree, a sale made pursuant to it, nor the confirmation of the sale by the court, made the
validity of the foreclosure res judicata between the parties to it,
and that consequently they furnished no defense to actions for
restoration of possession, and for force used in ejecting him,
brought by the bankrupt against the mortgagee who had pur3(1920) 254 U. S. 348, 41 S. Ct 116, 65 L. Ed. 297
4(1940) 308 U. S. 433, 60 S. Ct. 343, 84 L. Ed. 370.
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chased at the foreclosure sale and taken possession by aid of the
sheriff. The act of Congress, said Mr. Justice Black, "is the
supreme law of the land which all courts-state and federalmust observe. The wisdom and desirability of an automatic statutory ouster of jurisdiction of all except bankruptcy courts over
farmer-debtors and their property were considerationsfor Congress
alane" (italics supplied).
On the same day, and also without dissent, the same court held
in the case of Chicot County Drainage Distrwt, v. Baxter Banki
that although the Constitution of the United States, as was decided
0 upon the general
in Ashton v. Cameron Couty Water District,
principle that exempts state agencies from federal control, withholds from Congress power to authorize a federal court to discharge an insolvent state municipality from its debts, a federal
court decree, made pursuant to an invalid amendment to the
bankruptcy act, which decree purported to discharge a state nunicipality, was not a nullity, and that its entry, not appealed from,
made it "res judicata" that the debt had been wiped out, and so
constituted a defense to an action upon its bonds brought in a
federal court. Nothing was said in the opinion to the effect that
the Constitution of the United States, like the. act of Congress
in question in the Kalb case, is the supreme law of the land. and
that the wisdom and desirability of ousting the United States
government of jurisdiction over insolvent state municipalities were
considerations for the framers of the Constitution alone.
Less than three months after the decisions in the Kalb and
Chicot cases came the decision in United, States v. United Slates
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 7 The United States, in behalf of Indian
wards, had filed a claim in bankruptcy proceedings. The bankrupt
made a counterclaim for a greater amount and was awarded a
decree against the United States for the excess. As in the Clatcot
case, no appeal was taken. In a later suit brought by the United
States which involved the same parties, it was contended that the
decree made the liability of the United States res judicata. But
the Supreme Court held otherwise. It said that the bankruptcy
5(1940) 308 U. S. 371, 60 S. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329, rehearing denied,
(1940) 309 U. S. 695, 60 S. Ct. 581, 84 L. Ed. 1035. For comments on this
case, see 49 Yale L. J. 959-964, 54 Harv. L. R. 662-660; 28 Geo. L. R.

1006-1007, 1 Wash. & Lee L. R. 275-279. The decree purported to discharge
a state drainage district from liability on its bonds unless their holders
within a year accepted payment from a fund in court at thirty-six cents oil
the dollar.
6(1936) 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. Ed. 1309.
,(1940) 309 U. S. 506, 60 S. Ct. 653, 84 L. Ed. 894.
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court had no jurisdiction over the United States except by consent
of the United States. Its filing of a claim was not consent to the
entry of a judgment for what might be due on a counterclaim. The
Chicot case was therefore not directly applicable because on the
counterclaim the defendant was not before the court. Nevertheless
the Supreme Court went on to say that while the Chicot case
"definitely extended the area of adjudications that may not be the
.subject of collateral attack," the decision itself aas limited to
judgments in bankruptcy under a statute subsequently held invalid,
and that it did not declare an inflexible rule as to the susceptibility
to collateral attack of judgments in general. The statement either
repudiates the reasoning and therefore discredits the decision in
the Chicot case, or else it interprets that case, correctly it is suggested, as hoding that the judgment there in question made its
subject-matter res judicata for the reason that it was a valid judgment. For in the Chicot case the opinion purported to apply "the
general principles governing the defense of res judicata," and said
that "as the question of validity was one which had to be determined by a judicial decision, if determined at all, no reason appears
why it should not be regarded as determinable by the District
Court, like any other question affecting its jurisdiction." A judgment "that may not be the subject of collateral attack" or whose
"validity" is to be "regarded as determinable" by the court that
made it, is a valid judgment. Two months later, Mr. Justice
Douglas said, in Su~nsh.e Coal Co. v. Adktns s that as previous
cases had held; "in general, the principles of res judicata apply to
questions of jurisdiction as well as to other matters-whether it be
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties."
It is no doubt because of these decisions and dicta that the
Restatement of Judgments says in substance that a judgment which
a court was not empowered to make will nevertheless, for the
sake of-ending dispute, be treated in other suits between the parties to it as if, instead of being void, it had fixed their reciprocal rights,
except in cases where it is better not to treat it so, and that it then
proceeds to enumerate various circumstances which, if they exist,
make it better not to treat it so. The Chicot case is adduced in
illustration as a case where the validity of an invalid judgment may
not be collaterally attacked by the parties. Yet ofit of the five cir8(1940) 310 U. S. 381, 403, 60 S. Ct 907, 84 L. Ed. 1263. The "previous
cases" cited are Stoll v. Gottlieb, (1938) 305 U. S. 165, 58 S. Ct. -134, 83
L. Ed. 104, and Tremies v. Sunshine Mining Co., (1939) 308 U. S. 66. 60
S. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85. They are stated below. See notes 31 and 32. Neither
case holds that an invalid judgment may be res judicata of its validity.
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cumstances which the Restatement enumerates-as tending to show
that it is better not to treat the judgment as binding between the
parties four were present in the Chicot case. First, the lack of
jurisdiction in bankruptcy over the subject matter was clear because, before the District was sued upon its bonds and the validitv
of the discharge was brought into question, the Supreipe Court in
the Ashton case had expressly determined that Congress could not
empower a court to discharge a state municipality, and it was in
reliance on that determination that the suit was brought. Second.
the determination as to jurisdiction in bankruptcy depended whollv
on a question of law, for the question was whether federal power
extended to such a release. Third, the question of jurisdiction in
bankruptcy had not been litigated in the court that undertook to
exercise it. The court had taken its jurisdiction fo" granted, together with the validity of the act of Congress that purported to
authorize its exercise. Fourth, the policy against the court's acting
beyond its jurisdiction would seem to have been strong, because it
is important that the tederal government should not usurp power
reserved to the states. Therefore. though the Restatement (toes not
question the soundness of the decision in the Chicot case. it recognizes it with a Judas kiss. It is strange to adduce an object in
illustration of a snowball and then say of its qualities that they
are those pertaining to a lump of coal. One is reminded of what
Shakespeare's Antony said of the assassins of Caesar They
"bowed like bondmen" and then "behind struck Caesar on the
neck." But to say that a principle is inapposite to a case to which
it has been applied is not to condemn the principle itself. The Law
Institute can hardly ignore a unanimous judgment of the Uited
States Supreme Court. Yet, as has been suggested, the Chicot
case may have gone upon a different ground from that attributed
to it, and in bowing to its authority, the Institute has perhaps
made a bow in the wrong direction. The case seems to have held
that the judgment there in question was valid, and not that,
though it was invalid, the losing party must not be permitted
to say o. The case can better be discussed after considering the
principles that govern res judicata and the validity of judgments.
In its second illustration of a situation in which the needs of
policy are not strong enough to permit a party collaterallv to
attack an invalid judgment, the Restatement is also open to criticism. The case is Dars v. Dawis,9 in which, as the Restatement
interprets it. a Virginia decree of divorce was held to make it
9(1938) 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26.
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res judicata between the parties that the marriage had been dissolved, by making it res judicata that the husband was domiciled
in Virginia, even on the assumption that the court had no power
really to end the marriage, because neither party was really
domiciled there. In the first place the case seems inapposite as an
illustration. At most it holds, not that the validity of a judgment
may be res judicata merely because it was rendered, but that a
finding of fact on which an invalid judgment is based-the domcile of the husband-may be res judicata and thus indirectly estop
the parties from asserting the invalidity of the judgment itself?0
Secondly, if it is true that the decree did not really end the marriage, a stronger case in which op grounds of public policy collateral attack by the defeated party ought to be permitted can
hardly be imagined. If the marriage is not ended, the husband
still owes the wife a duty to support her, but' if the validity of
the divorce is res judicata, she cannot enforce it. Yet he may be
subject to criminal liability for not supporting her, and any third
person who furnished her with needed support should be able to
hold the husband for its value, for he claims reimbursement by
a right of his own, acquired by having performed a duty resting
on the husband, and not by any subrogation to a right of the wife.
Whatever marital misconduct either might be guilty of in future,
neither could get a divorce from the other, for it would be res
judicata that they were divorced already The policy of the divorce
statute is defeated. It is -true, that similar consequences might
tollow a judgment for plaintiff in a suit for jactitation of marriage, or in an action for assault, if marriage were pleaded in defense and found mistakenly not to exist; but they would be consequences of the ordinary application of res judicata to valid
judgments, without regird to considerations of policy in the particular case." On this theory of Davis v. Davis, a person who wins
a contested decree of divorce, but is found to have mistaken tie
domicile, becomes for practical purposes single, for there is no enforcible right to consortium or support, and yet is forbidden to
IOSee Mr. Justice Jackson in Williams v. North Carolina, (1942) 317
U. S. 287, 319, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 189, footnotes 6 and 7 to Ins opinion.
However in Andrews v. Andrews (1900) 176 'Mass. 92, 57 N. E. 333, af-

firmed (-1903) 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366, though the defendant appeared, the court did not hold res judicata the finding that plaintiff
was domiciled in the state, presumably because it deemed the doctrine maprlicable to findings in an invalid judgment as well as inapplicable to the
validity of the judgment itself.

"However since the doctrine of res judicata in its application to matters
of fact itself rests on policy, it is not always applied. See footnotes 15 and

"18 infra.
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marry anyone else. To forbid an unmarried person to marry is
generally not due process of law To bring about a situation practically identical with it can hardly be consistent with policy 12
There is an attractive simplicity in the doctrine of the Restatement that where a court makes a judgment that is void "and the
defendant takes no proceedings directly to attack the judgment,
121n Andrews v. Andrews, (1900) 176 Mass. 92, 95, 57 N. E. 333,
Holmes, J., repeating a remark to the same effect in Adams v. Adams (1891)
154 Mass. 290, 295, 28 N. E. 260, 13 L. R. A. 275, said. "As a general rule
it would be inconvenient to admit that parties who were divorced as between
themselves were not divorced as against others."
It would seem that a judgment valid between the parties ought to be
and perhaps will be treated as valid altogether. In Baldwin v. Traveliing
Men's Association (1931) 283 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244, it
was held that a defendant's appearance, though expressly made for the sole
purpose of convincing the court that, since he had not been effectively served
with summons, it had no power to affect his rights, nevertheless conferred
on the court, on its mistaken finding that he had been served, a power to
make the fact of service res judicata, and hence to estop the defendant to
deny that the judgment was valid. This makes a special appearance in a
federal court quite a different thing from a permitted method of convincing
the court that it lacks power. It makes it confer power to control the defendant's rights so far as to render its judgment on the merits enforcible
against him. If the defendant, remaining outside the state, had sent a messenger with affidavits to show he had never set foot in the state, the court
might have received them, believed them insufficient to overcome the sheriff's
return of service, and entered judgment by default, but the judgment would
lave been void, and the fact of service not res judicata. If instead of sending
affidavits, the defendant sends witnesses to testify in person, with a lawyer
to ask them questions, and the court without the entrance of formal special
appearance consents to hear them, the result should be the same. But once
the conclusion is reached that a special appearance in a federal court to
contest jurisdiction is more than a mere attempt to convince the court that
it ought not to proceed to judgment, but is granted only on condition of submission to the authority of the court to determine its jurisdiction, so that it
estops to deny the existence of jurisdictional facts found, there seems to be
no good reason why the determination that service was valid, being effective
to make an estoppel, should not also be effective to make valid the judgment
rendered in pursuance of it. It is as easy to say that the defendant, having
invoked the court's decision as to its jurisdiction, has thereby empowered it
to act on its decision and make a valid judgment, as to say lie has empowered
it to make a judgment whose validity he cannot dispute against the plaintiff.
Had the defendant expressly consented to judgment provided it were found
he was duly served, the judgment would be valid. If his special appearance
is a submission to the decision as to whether he has been duly served that
binds the parties to the judgment made, it should bind to the judgment
everyone else whose interest in the matter at stake was insufficient to entitle
him to a hearing as to what the judgment should be. A determination that
service has been made is as likely to be true as would be a contrary, determination in any other proceeding, and nothing can be gained by permitting
the validity of the judgment to be questioned in further litigation by a third
person merely on the ground of lack of service. If the judgment creditor
can get service on the defendant in a second suit, he may sue him on the
judgment. The debtor will be estopped to deny its validity and the judgment
on the ,u'gment will be valid against everybody. It is submitted that a
judgment like that in the Baldwin case, if held to estop to deny service,
should be held valid. Such a holding would be consistent with due process
whether made pursuant to statute, (York v. Texas (1890) 137 U. S. 15, 11
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the question whether he should be permitted collaterally to attack
the judgment is a question of -weighing the policy underlying the
rules of res judicata against the policy prohibiting a court from
exceeding the powers conferred upon it." Yet it may be suggested
that on established principles that policy must always prevail
which denies its purported effect to the act of a governmental
S. Ct 9, 34 L. Ed. 604) or by ruling as to common law (Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, (1917) 244 U. S. 25, 37 S. Ct. 492, 61 L. Ed. 966).
Compare Restatement: judgments, Sees. 9a, 20, b, c, to the effect that if a
court has no power to give judgment against a defendant not served, it is
not due process to give it on a mistaken finding of service. For similar
reasons it may be strongly urged that the divorce in Davis v. Davis (1938)
305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26, was valid. The decision, after hearing, that the husband was domiciled in Virginia was as likely to be correct
as any later decision that he was not. Why permit its validity to be attacked in Virginia or elsewhere by a third person, and to depend in each
state on the decision of its courts as to whether the determination of domicile of the Virginia or of the District of Columbia court was correct?
Why permit a man who is a husband in one state to cast off his wife in
another? It is true that the state of the actual domicile had an interest in
the marital status of its domiciliaries, but that interest is practically destroyed by a doctrine of res judicata that permits then to live in the marrined
state when they please, and to repudiate its mutual obligations when
they please. It is true that holding the divorce valid would involve overruling
Andrews v. Andrews, (1903) 188 U. S.14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366. as
for somewhat similar reasons Haddock v. Haddock, (1906) 201 U. S. 562,
26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, wvas overruled in Williams v. North Carolina

(1942) 317 U. S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 189. In the latter case, Mr.

Justice Douglas, for the majority, deprecated as iilerently unsound a rule
that would subject a man to imprisonment in one state for bigamous
cohabitation with a woman who was his wife in another, or bastardize in
one state children legitimate in another. He even expressly refrained frdm
intimating an opinion as to whether, in spite of the decision in Bell v. Bell
(1901) 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804, a divorce might not be
entitled to full faith and credit as valid though neither party was domiciled
in the state that assumed to make it.
One may wonder why the full faith and credit clause should be held
to require, as Williams v. North Carolina holds that it does require, that
the will of the state where one party to a divorce is donuciled to end the
marriage shall prevail over the will of the other party's state that the
marriage shall continue, as in South Carolina where marriage is indissoluble; and what the result would be if the legislature of one state on tie
application of its domiciliary passed an act to end ie marfiage, while ile
legislature of the state of the spouse simultaneously enacted that the marriage should continue. But if it is part of the purpose iiputed to the faith
and credit clause to make status as to marriage uniform throughout the
Union, the purpose cannot be sufficiently attained unless a divorct made on
a finding of domicile by a court that has the parties before it is recognized
as valid. In Stoll v. Gottlieb, (1938) 305 U. S.165, 171-172, 59 S. Ct. 134,
83 L. Ed. 104, if the interpretation of that case hereinafter suggested is
right, Mr. Justice Reed probably thought that the judgments in the Baldwin and Davis cases were valid. But see Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, ii
Williams v. North Carolina, (1942) 317 U. S. 287, 320, note 7. 63 S. Ct.
207, 223, 87 L. Ed. 189. A divorce on mistaken finding of domicile in the
state, where both parties were before the court, was held valid i Kinnier
v. Kinmer, (1871) 45 N. Y. 535, 543. 53 Bar. 454. And see, Camipbell, J.,
dissenting in People v. Dawell, (1872) 25 Mich. 247, 270-3, and W~raldo v.
Waldo, (1883) 52 Mich. 94, 100, 17 N. W 694.
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agency outside the field of its power. Estoppel to deny its efficacy
concedes to it its purported effect so far as the estoppel goes.
Simplicity in statement may entail difficulty in application. The
Restatement's theory requires the court to pick and choose
among those judgments which the legislature has made void, and
ordinarily to enforce as between the parties those which it thinks
the legislature had little reason to make void. Policy would require, perhaps, that a judgment condemning to cruel and unusual
punishment, or decreeing specific performance of a contract to
labor as a slave, made on the theory that servitude voluntarily
contracted for is not involuntary, should usually be held void,
however high the court that may have affirmed it, unless that
court's decisions bind as precedent, but as for a judgment that
exceeds a restraint on power which the court sees little reason
for, such as that preventing the federal discharge of a state
municipality from debt, its validity should be held to be res
judicata. If so, the principle ought to apply to the degree in
which a judgment exceeds the judicial power, and the validity
of a sentence to a punishment only a little cruel, or a condemnation to slavery for a very short time should ordinarily be deemed
res judicata, if the hardship to thevictim were thought to be less
than the hardship that would be imposed on the court and the
opposing party by having the case reopened. The ordinary rule
of res judicata is not a matter of discretion and has no application to judgments. It applies only to findings about the relations
between parties upon which judgments are based.
The rules of res judicata cannot be applied to the question of
a judgment's validity in the way in which the Restatement proposes to apply it. So applied it becomes a rule new in nature and
effect. It is true that the power of the court to render the judgment applied for is always practically, if not technically, in issue.
The defendant may challenge the power, and whether lie does
so or not the court must make up its mind whether it has authority to enter the judgment it makes. But on what principle shall it
be determined whether public interest requires that an end be
put to litigation by pretending that a void judgment is valid? If
the defendant was too poor or too ignorant to appeal, and
especially if by law no appeal was open, it is strong medicine to
enforce in the public interest a void judgment because it is too
much trouble and expense to find out whether it was void. If it
is not justice, and hence not policy, to enforce a void judgment
against one who had no opportunity in fact to appeal from it. an
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investigation should be made of his knowledge of his right and
of his financial means. And if a defendant refrains from appealumg solely in reliance upon the truth that the judgment in its purported effect is a nullity because its maker usurped a power lie
did not possess, why should it make a difference whether the
usurper is a private arbitrator, an administrative commission, a
justice of the peace, or a body of learned men- who wear black
robes?
If a judgnent, either in substance or because of the procedure
by which it was reached, is a judgment of a kind that the court
lacks constitutional or statutory power to make, it must fail of
effect for the same reason and to the same extent that the act
of an executive or of a legislature of a kind it has not power to
make fails of effect. For the same reason and to the same extent
it should be treated by courts as without effect. A court cannot
properly do that which it has no power to do, even though it
or some other court has decided in a suit between the same
parties that it will have power to do it. Similarly it cannot properly
treat as effective the act of another court which it knows to have
been beyond that court's power, simply because that court in a
suit between the same parties decided that it would have power
to do it. That is what was decided in Kalb v. Feuerstem.13 It is
hard to reconcile that decision with the doctrine of the Restatement.
The difficulty and uncertainty attending the subject suggest
inquiry into the principles that determine the validity of judgments, as well as into those that underlie the doctrines denoted
by the ambiguous term res judicata.
RES JUDICATA

The questions that arise in a given case may be classified
(among other possible ways) as follows 1. What is the case?
2. What ought the court to do about it? The answer to the first
question states the facts of the case and the obligations of the
parties toward each other that result from the facts. It does not
include the general propositions of law in which their obligations
may be expressed. Considered in relation to the second question,
it is a question wholly of fact; although the answer to it, so,
far as concerns the obligations of the parties, depends upon matters of law. That A is B's promisor, and that A is B's debtor,
i3Supra, footnote 4.
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are in the sense here relevant equally matters of fact. It is inm aterial that the fact that A is B's debtor is the result of a rule of law
relating to the effect of promises. 1 4 The answer to the second quetion-what ought the court to do about the case ?-tells whether the
court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or take jurisdiction,
and, if it takes jurisdiction, deny relief on the merits, or give relief,
and, if so, what relief. It is a question wholly of law It relates, not
to the basis of the court's action, but to the action itself, although
the answer to it depends on the facts of the case, including the
facts as to the obligations of the parties that grow out of the
primary facts.
If relief is given or denied, the primary facts and the resulting obligations between the parties which formed the necessary
ground on which relief was given or denied, and which therefore
must have been adjudged to exist in fact, are, at least in general,
said to be matter adjudged-res judicata. In other proceedings between the same parties afterward to be decided it is to be
taken as settled that those facts are what in the former proceeding they were held to be."
The characteristic of this doctrine is that it assumes to be
true what perhaps is not true, but assumes it only as between
the parties or those connected in interest with them, and only
in other proceedings. The purpose and result of this rule of law
is that what has been decided to be true and made the basis of
one judgment is available as the basis of, another judgment
without being proved over again. But it is not the court's
coming to a decision as to the facts of a case that makes the
14U. S. v. Moser, (1924)
266 U. S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 66, 69 L. Ed. 262.
The correctness of a rule of law on which an earlier case was decided is
not res judicata in a later case. The doctrine of collateral estoppel has no

application to the correctness of an abstract rule of law. Compare Professor
Austin W Scott, "Collateral Estoppel by Judgment," 56 Harv. L. R. 1, 10.
"As this doctrine rests on a weighing of competing interests it is not
always applied. The interest in security against illegal imprisonment is felt
to oe so strong that in most states a prisoner is entitled to an independent
judgment on the merits upon successive writs of habeas -corpus though

brought on the same ground. Salinger v. Loisel. (1924) 265 U. S. 224, 230.
44 S. Ct. 519, 68 L. Ed. 989; Wong Doo v. U. S., (1924) 265 U. S. 239,

44 S. Ct 524, 68 L. Ed. 999; 38 Yale L. J. 299, American Jurisprudence,
Title Habeas Corpus, Sec. 157 A court may have jurisdiction to enjoin
an act of government in excess of governmental power, and its judgment
dismissing a suit for injunction be valid even though the governmental
act is not valid. But it does not follow that a second court must be powerless to save the complainant from an act it knows to be illegal for the sole
reason that the first court did not know it to be illegal, especially where

in the meantime the highest court of appeal has conclusively held that it is

illegal. It may be the duty of a court to give relief that it knows as matter
of law that a petitioner is entitled to.
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facts res judicata. It is the entering of a judgment'that makes
res judicata the facts on which the judgment is based-"' So too
it is not a court's decision that its judgment will be valid, nor
its entering the judgment that makes it res judicata that the
judgment is valid. To make the validity of the judgment res
judicata in this sense of the term would require the entering
of a second judgment based upon a finding that the former
judgment was valid.
In short, in this sense of the term, res judicata applies only
to those matters which go to make up the case before the court.
It has no application to any other matters that the court has to
consider in deciding what to do. The'entry of a judgment, unappealed from, does not, under such a doctrine of res judicata,
make it conclusive between the parties that the judgment has the
effect it purports to have, any more than it makes it conclusive
that it is just or that it is correct in point of law.
Thus in Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Association,'7 where
the question had been whether the pretended service on the defendant was sufficient in law, and the parties were before the
court, the entering of judgment for the plaintiff made res judicata
only the facts on which it was based, including the fact, held to
exist because the service was deemed good, that the parties stood
to each other in the relation of party suing and party sued. M[r.
Justice Roberts said "The substantial matter for determination
is whether the judgment imounts to res judicata on the question
of the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it over tile person
of the respondent." The case did not decide that the court's
determination that its judgment when entered would be valid
made its validity res judicata.18
16 Oklahoma City v. McMaster, (1905) 196 U. S. 529, 25 S. Ct. 324,

49 L. Ed. 587, 36 Corpus Juris 767
17(1931) 283 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244.
'sCompare Restatement of Judgments, Sec. 9. Res Judicata and Jurisdiction over the Person.
It has been questioned whether the doctrine of res judicata should apply
to facts determined to exist and made the basis of a judgment, if it is proved
that the court had no jurisdiction and that the judgment was consequently
invalid. But the cases which hold that the doctrine may under some circumstances apply-to facts made the basis of an invalid judgment have no bearing on the question whether a judgment may be res judicata of its own
validity.
If the reason why the court lacked power to make a valid judgment
is that the legislature had not seen fit to entrust it with deciding questions
of the character of those it undertook to decide, as if a probate court should
entertain an action of tort, there is force in the contention that no effect
should be accorded its attempt to determine the facts. If a soldier's twin
brother is convicted by court martial by mistake for the soldier and im-
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All tha, in this sense of the term. could have been res
judicata in the Chicot case was that the municipality was indebted to its creditor, was insolvent, had petitioned for a discharge and that the creditor had been notified. It had no right
that the creditor should release it. The question of law that remained to be decided was whether the court should release it.
It was not res judicata that the-municipality had been released.
That was not within the issues of the case. It was not the basis
of the judgment. It could not have been true until the judgment
had been entered.
But the term res judicata is sometimes used in another sense.19
Relief, if given, is given 'in the form of a judgment or decree
which, provided that it is valid, creates a new right that either
supersedes or supplements the old right on which it was based,
at least within the jurisdiction where the decree is made. Thus a
judgment giving damages for breach of contract wipes out the
claim on the contract and substitutes a new right on the judgment, which may be for accumulated interest and costs as well
as for the claim that existed when the suit was begun. That this
new right is to exist has been adjudicated, and so its existence
may be called res judicata. In this use of the teri, it prevents
dispute, not as to the facts which the judgment established,
20
but as to the efficacy of the judgment itself.
prisoned, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the government was
estopped to deny his right to a soldier's pay. But it does not follow that
his membership in the army is res judicata, if he applies by habeas corpus
for release, or sues for false imprisonment. His acquittal by court imartial
might make his innocence res judicata in a later prosecution ii a civil
court, but it does not follow that his conviction by court martial would
make his guilt res judicata. A purpose of restricting the court martial's
jurisdiction was to secure to civilians the securities that attend trial in civil
courts. It would defeat the purpose to make its decisions res judicata against
him, not so to make them res judicata in his favor.
When, as in Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Association, (1931) 283 U. S.
522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244, the court has jurisdiction of cases and
persons of the class before it but jurisdiction is challenged by special appearance for want of service, the appearance may be treated as empowering
the court to decide as to the fact of service, and, if service is found, to niake
res judicata the issues between them, even if it be assumed that if there was
no proper service the judgment was invalid and subject to attack by other
creditors of the defendant. So, too, as has been suggested im discussing the
case of Davis v. Davis, (1938) 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 82 L. Ed. 26, if in
a suit for divorce, a court which has the parties before it decides nistakenly
that the party suing is domiciled in the state and has cause for divorce,
the decree of divorce may without inconsistency be held res Judicata as to
domicile or the existence of cause for divorce, although it were held that
the decree was invalid, and its validity not res judicata between the parties.
19Beale, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 450.1, Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 2450, note.
0See Cromwell v. County of Sac, (1877) 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195.
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When res judicata is used in this sense to mean that a valid
judgnent imposes the obligation it purports to impose, or, as in
bankruptcy, extinguishes an obligation it purports to extinguish,
it is a statement of the truth. It is true, not only between the
parties, but as to all the world. Every valid judgment is a judgment in rem as to the matter it adjudges. The difference between
what is ordinarily called a judgment in rem and what is ordinarily called a judgment in personam lies in the scope of the
judgment-the character of the thing adjudged,-and not in the
effect of the judgnent within its scope. " ' If A has a valid judg2
The phrase, a right ti ren (though occasionally used to mean a
special right in a particular object) usually means a right which, like a
right to a tangible object, exists against persons in general. Right is here
used in its broad sense to include all the attributes of property, not only
freedom from interference with one's property, but the privilege of enjoying
it, and the power of disposing of it. An action ti rein means an action whose
object is to obtain a judgment that shall establish a right in rem. A judyment in rein means a judgment which establishes or purports to establish
such a right. Such a- judgment is usually, but not necessarily, a judgment
establishing against all possible adverse claimants a property interest in a
tangible object, generally a lien upon it. The appropriate place to bring the
action is generally the place where the object happens to be, and not a different place where the claimant or the owner happens to be, or where lie is
domiciled, or where the object has a situs for taxation. For it generally
would be unjust and impracticable to require the claimant to go in search
of the owner, it cannot certainly be known who all ie owners are. and
only at the place where the object is can a judgment for the claimant
effectually be executed by delivering the object to him, or selling it and giving mimfrom the proceeds enough to satisfyjus claim. An owner, on ie

other hand, usually has means of kiiowing where his property is and even

in case of an estray can go in search of it.
But a judgment in rem may be rendered where no property interest
exists. There may be need of a judgment in adoption proceedings which
shall establish the right to the custody and future earnings of a clild against
all possible claimants, or, where slavery exists, to a conclusive determination
of freedom from any master. It might become desirable to establish beforehand the validity as against adverse clainants of a proposed marriage, by
requiring all who know reason why the parties should not be joined in
matrimony to speak then or forever hold their peace. The proper forum for
such judgments would seem to be, not the place where the persons concerned happened to be found, but the place of their donicile.
As we started by saying that the place to bring an action ii.reni is the
place where the res is, we now say in a case of permanent adoption, as
distinguished from temporary custody, that the real res is not ie child, but
the relation of parent or adopter and child, and that it has its situs at tie
appropriate domicile. In truth we do not first see that die res is there and
consequently detenmine that that is the place with jurisdiction to act. \Ve
decide that that is the proper place to act, and, because we ink so, it seems
to us that that is where the res is. \Ve think of it as belonging to die place
that we think ought to control it.
There are cases where the judgment is only in personam, but itepresence of the parties is not necessary, or in some cases sufficient, for jurisdiction. When it has been determined that jurisdiction should depend on
the presence of a chattel attached, or of a debtor garnished, or on the
domicile of a party to a suit for divorce, we think of the suit as related
to a thing situated where the jurisdiction exists, and call it an action quasi
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ment against B, 'it is true as regards everybody that A has a
claim on the judgment against B, and no other creditor of B can
object to A's being admitted to a claim against B's assets, unless
ground is shown for setting A's judgment aside.2 ' The fact that
the judgment is erroneous is immaterial. It is not a case of treating as true that which may not be true. That A has a claim
on the judgment is true. Res judicata in this sense is not a rule
that applies only as between the parties to the judgment, nor is
it, like the rule that treats facts found to be true in one case as
true in another, a rule that the legislature could destroy without
destroying the validity of judgments. But it can be applicable
only when the court had power to bring the judgment right into
existence. Hence it might be less confusing to call it the rule
of res facta, and so avoid ambiguity in the use of the term
res judicata.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS

A court has to make up its mind whether it has authority to
enter judgment on the merits, and if so what judgment. The reain rem. It resembles an action in rem in that jurisdiction does not rest on
control over the person of a defendant, and that judgment is enforcible
against the defendant only as to his interest in the subject matter on which
the jurisdiction rested. (Compare the Introductory Note in Chapter I of the
Restatement of Judgments.)
The value and validity of a distinction between rights in rem and rights
in personam has been questioned. It has been suggested that rights might
better be classified as multital, paucital and unital. Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions, 26 Yale L. J. 710, 716, 718, 733, 743, Corwin, Jural Relations and their Classification, 30 Yale L. J. 226, 232, note 4. But the (istinction is real and of practical importance, however inaptly it may be expressed by contrasting res with persona. Its essence lies in the character
of the right, and not in the number of persons against whom it is available.
That is an accidental consequence of its character, though it may generally
be a convenient badge by which to identify it. In a suit for a breach of a
right in rem, it suffices for the plaintiff to prove the act or onission of the
defendant which is alleged as a breach of duty, and it then rests on the
defendant to show facts which exempt him from the duty, such as consent
to what would otherwise be a trespass. If the suit is for breach of a right
in personam, the plaintiff must show, not only defendant's conduct, but facts
that subjected the defendant to a duty to conduct himself otherwise, such as
the making of a contract. Whether the facts show that one, a few, many, or
all but one person are subjected to or exempted from the duty is of little
significance. Nor is it of significance that the law may sometimes make an
act a tort only when done by members of a certain class, so that the plaintiff
must prove not only the act, but that it was done by a member of that class.
22Mattingly v. Nye, (1869) 8 Wall. 370, 373, 19 L. Ed. 380; Anderson
v. Hultberg, (1918) 247 Fed. 273, 277-8, cert. denied 2,18 U. S. 581, and see
Gelston v. Hoyt, (1818) 3 Wheaton 246, 4 L. Ed. 381 (a judgment denying
the existence of a right in rem is conclusive as to everybody). A creditor
has an interest in the entry of any judgment against his insolvent debtor.
But the law does not require those whose interests are concerned to be
made parties to an action, but only those whose rights are to be established
or disestablished by the judgment.
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sons of convenience that underlie the doctrine which makes decisions of fact in one case conclusive between the parties in
another, may apply to a considerable extent to conclusions about
the validity of a judgmnlnt about to be rendered. That doctrine
however is inapplicable, because if the legislature has decreed
that the judgment, .if made, shall be void of effect, it cannot alter
the rights of the parties, and hence cannot properly be given
effect so as to make it alter them. That the court or the parties
believed that the judgment would determine their rights is unmaterial. Hence the-maxim that there should be an end to litigation is irrelevant. If, indeed, the legislature thinks it policy that
the court's mistake as to the intended limits of itt power should
not make its judgment ineffective, it can, and often does, confer
on the court an enlarged jurisdiction-a power to decide, not
merely cases of a certain class, but cases which the court finds to
be of that class. For like reasons a similar power is often granted
to administrative officers and is conceded by the common law
to private persons. For any person, layman, administrator or
judge, may have to make up his mind whether an occasion has
arisen on which it is his duty to act. If he deems it his duty, it
is to be expected that he will act. In the interest of efficiency,
tairness or finality it is often desirable to treat his act as valid
even when it was mistaken. Thus a citizen may validly arrest an
innocent person he reasonably suspects of a felony that has actually been committed. An agent may often bind his principal
though he acts on too broad an interpretation of his authority,1
or under a mistake about the existence of the facts on which his
authority .depends.2-4 Administrative officers are frequently empowered and, in a sense, bound to act when they believe, though
mistakenly, that the facts of a case are such as would require
their action.2 5 Whether to give such power to a court is a question of policy for the makers of constitutions and statutes to
decide. If such power has been conferred by a legislature that
had constitutional power ,to confer it, the court has jurisdiction
over a case which it finds to be within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, and the judgment is valid, not as res judicata,
but of its inherent force.
The Constitution and the acts of Congress confer on federal
district courts a general jurisdiction over cases of monetary im2-Restatement: Agency, Secs. 38, 44.
24
2 Restatement: Agency, Sec. 45, comment (c).
"The Separation of Goverriniental Powers,' 29 Yale L. J. 369, 384-6.
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portance between citizens of different states, and over cases arising under laws of the United States. If a question arises in a
district court as to whether the parties to a pending case are
citizens of different states, or whether the case is of the kind
meant by the phrase "arising under * * * the laws of the United
States," it is the duty of the court to decide the question and if
it decides it in the affirmative to enter judgment on the merits.
Unless the question is-free from substantial doubt there is reason
to expect that the court may enter such a judgment. The principle applies which under analogous circumstances frequently
enables a private agent to bind his principal, and an administrative officer to act validly though mistakenly Thus in Des Maies
Navtgatwn Company v. Iowa Homestead Co.2n1 where the correct
exercise of federal jurisdiction depended upon every plaintiff's
being a citizen of a different state from the state of which any defendant was a citizen, it was held that the judgment was valid
though opposing parties were citizens of the same state. The
grant of jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states contemplated its exercise over persons who were
found to be such citizens. The court said. "To determine whether
the suit was removable in whole or in part, or not, was certainly
within the power of the circuit court. The decision of that question was the exercise, and the rightful exercise, of jurisdiction
* * * " In Dowell v Applegate,27 a debtor conveyed land and
his judgment creditor sued the grantee to have the deed set
aside and the land sold to satisfy the judgment. The federal court
took jurisdiction because it was alleged that the deed was void
by federal law for lack of sufficient federal revenue stamps, set
the deed aside and ordered the land sold. The creditor bought it.
The grantee sued him in a state court to quiet title, alleging that
the sale was void because the federal court had no jurisdiction
to order it. The United States Supreme Court held on writ of
error to the state court that even if the claim as to lack of stamps
was not enough to make the case one which the federal trial
court was intended to decide, it was one which the Constitution
and laws empowered it validly to decide, and that the sale pursuant to its order passed title. It was said that whether the case
arose under the laws of the United States was a question which
the trial court "was competent to determine in the first instance"
and that its determination was conclusive on the parties who
26(1887) 123 U. S. 552, 8 S. Ct. 217, 31 L. Ed. 202.
27(1894) 152 U. S. 327, 340, 14 S. Ct. 611, 38 L. Ed. 463.
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could question it only on appeal. This meant that the decree was
valid, not that it was conclusive evidence of its own validity, for
the case came from a state court on writ of error and it is no
error in federal law for a state court to hold that parties before
it are at liberty to give evidence of the truth about a federal
judgment. In Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Gulf, etc. Ry.,- 5
it was held that a district court with statutory authority to enjoin the construction, without a certificate of necessity, of new
railroad trackage, provided that the trackage was an extension
of its line,. as distinguished from a spur, might validly enjoin the
construction of a track which was only a spur, on a mistaken
finding that it was an extension. Mr. Justice Brandeis said.
"Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine
whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist."
Accordingly in the Chicot case it was said. "The lower federal courts * * * are courts with authority (italics supplied)
to determine whether they have jurisdiction to entertain the
cause and for this purpose to construe and apply the statute under
which they are asked to act." And in Stoll v. Gottlieb0 it was
said. '7it is frequently said that there are certain jurisdictional
facts, the existence of which is essential to the validity of the
proceedings and the absence of which renders the act of the
court a nullity. * * * For instance, service of process in a
common law action within a state, publication of notice in strict
form in proceedings in rem against absent defendants, the appointment of an administrator for-a living person, a court martial
of a civilian. Upon the other hand there are quasi-jurisdictional
facts, diversity of citizenship, majority of litigants, and jursdiction of parties, a mere finding of which, regardless of actual existence, is sufficient."
In short, so long as a district court acts within reason, and
the parties are properly before it, the Constitution and statutes
do not intend to make the validity of its judgment depend on the
truth of its findinga of fact or of its interpretation of the jurisdictional statute.3 0 But if the Constitution deprives the United
28(1926) 270 U. S. 266, 46 S. Ct. 263, 70 L. Ed. 578.
-!9(1938) 305 U. S. 165, 176-7, 59 S. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 87
30
Matter. of Gregory, (1911) 219 U. S. 210 U. S. 217, 31 S. Ct. 143,
55 L. Ed. 184. (Per Hughes, J., "Given a valid enactment, the question
whether a particular case falls within the prohibition is for the determination of the court to which has been confided jurisdiction over the class of
offences to which the state relates.") Denver First National Bank v. Klug,
(1902) 186 U. S. 202, 22 S. Ct. 895, 46 L. Ed. 1127, (bankrupt validly held
not entitled to discharge because found, though erroneously, to be a farmer.),
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States of power to produce a specific result, such zis the release
of a state municipality from debt, the matter is different.
Courts, as well as Congress, are deprived of power to bring it
about, and a judgment that purports to produce it is necessarily
void of effect.
On the other hand a judgment is not invalid merely because it
enforces a void statute any more than because it misinterprets a
valid one. In either case, if it is a judgment of a kind the court
had power to make, for example, a judgment for money in an
action of tort or contract, the judgment is valid, though in either
case it is erroneous, because there was nothing in the statute to
justify it. The exercise of an authorized power is not invalid
merely because the way it is exercised results from a nisunderstanding of the law about the subject matter, whether the law
involved is common, statutory or constitutional. Mistakenly to
adjudge that a man is under obligation to do what he is not under
obligation to do. is not more invalid when the reason he is not
under obligation to do it'
is that a statute which purports to inpose
the obligation is void than when the reason is anything else. Imposing an obligation by misunderstanding the Constitution is like
imposing it by misunderstanding a fact. This is so though the
reason the statute is invalid is that it deprives of property without
due process of law A money judgment that enforces an invalid
statute duly found to be valid takes by due process of law It is
like fining an innocent man duly found to be guilty Consequently
the judgment of a federal court, if the case is of a class to which
its junsdiction extends, is valid and can be attacked only for error,
in spite of the fact that by misconstruction of the Constitution it
enforces an unconstitutional statute and thereby denies a constitutional right.
Thus if Congress should enact that gratuitous promises should
carry contractual obligation, or that no promise should be enFairbanks Shovel Co. v. Wills, (1916) 240 U. S.642, 649, 36 S. Ct. 466,
60 L. Ed. 841 (non-resident adjudicated a bankrupt), Noble v. Union River
Logging R.R., (1893) 147 U. S.165, 173-177, 13 S. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123.
and cases there cited ("Examples of these are the allegations and proof of
the requisite diversity of citizenship or of the amount in controversy in a
federal court, which when found by such court cannot be questioned, collaterally.") , In re Sawyer, (1888) 124 U. S. 200, 220, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31
L. Ed. 402, Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., (1941) 311 U. S. 484, 501, 503, 61
S. Ct. 326, 85 L. Ed. 297, (though statutory right to sue is limited to "any
person not an enemy" a judgment is valid in spite of an erroneous determination of "the so-called 'jurisdictional' question of the right to sue"). Coinpare Fall v. Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S.1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 (master's
deed of land in another state does not pass title)
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forcible unless under seal, a suit on a gratuitous promise, or a
defense claimed by reason of the act in a suit on a contract not
under seal, would arise under a de facto law of the United States,
and a judgment, state or federal, of a court with jurisdiction of the
parties and the cause erroneously holding the statute constitutional
and giving it effect would be valid. So it is if the United States sties
to collect a tax and the court wrongly overrules a contention that
the tax is a tax on exports within the meaning of the clause that
says "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
state." Or wrongly overrules a contention that the tax being
arbitrarily inposed on a single class of persons, deprives them of
property without due process of law The judgment is one which
the court has power to make, for it is a judgment on a claim for
money arising under a law of the United States, or in a suit to
which the United States is a party The judgment is valid, though
the statute was not. Its enforcibility rests on its validity and not on
any theory that, though invalid, its validity is res judicata between
the parties to it. Yet if the Constitution had said. "No judgment
enforcing the collection of a tax on exports shall be valid," it
wotild be plain that no doctrine, whether called res judicata or by
any other name, could by attaching itself to such a judgment
maneuver it into a position of validity or disable anybody from
asserting its invalidity merely because it had been entered. And so
of any other judgment which expressly or by implication the Constitution makes invalid.
It cannot be the intent of th e makers of law that a court from
which they have deemed it politic to withhold power to make a
judgment that shall have effect of its own force shall nevertheless
have power to make a judgment that shall become indisputable by
the mere fact that it was made. To say that a judgment is not
within a court's intended power is to say that it is intended to be
void of its purported effect. That appeal to a higher court was
allowed but not taken canhot enlarge its effect unless it was intended that it should be valid unless appealed from. That the
court has to decide, and that the parties have submitted to its
decision, the question whether it was intended to have the power
claimed is relevant only if it was intended to have the power on
condition that it decided it was intended to have it. A judgment
intended to be void if made, is not intended to bind the parties
because made.
It is hard to support in principle the doctrine that a person
may for reasons of policy be compelled to acquiesce in the judgment
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of a court from which for reasons of policy the legislature has
withheld authority to control his rights. The only decision that
may seem to give substantial support to such a doctrine is the
Chicot case."1 That case professed to follow Stoll v Gottlieb. "
Stoll v Gottlieb went ol the ground that the judgment there in
question was valid.
In Stoll v Gottlieb, a federal court, as an incident to a reorganization in bankruptcy, made a decree which purported to discharge
from obligation, not only the bankrupt, but also one who had
guaranteed that the bankrupt would pay his debts. A creditor,
thinking the discharge invalid, sued on the guaranty in a state
court of Illinois. The guarantor pleaded that the discharge made
it res judicata that he was not liable. If the discharge was valid
the plea was good. Thereupon the creditor applied to the federal
court to vacate its decree as invalid. The court refused to vacate it.
According to the doctrine that Congress intends to authorize the
district courts to act in cases they reasonably deem to fall within
the meaning of a statute that gives them jurisdiction, the discharge
of the guarantor was valid if Congress might validly have authorized it. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois thought it invalid
because not within the true meaning of the bankruptcy act. That
31(1940) 308 U. S. 433, 60 S. Ct. 343, 84 L. Ed. 370, supra note 4.
Tremies v. Sunshine Mining Co., (1939) 308 U. S. 66, 60 S. Ct. 44, 84
L. Ed. 85, holds only that the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
that another court did not have jurisdiction may be res judicata between
the parties like any other decision of essential fact. Sunshine Coal Co. v.
Adkins, (1940) 310 U. S.381, 60 S. Ct. 907, 84 L. Ed. 1263, supra note 8,
sustains a federal tax on sales of coal found by a commission 'to be bitummous, or actually bituminous and not found by the Commission to be nonbituminous. The Commission was practically a board of assessors to determine, not value, but the character of coal as to taxability. In a suit to
enjoin the collection of a tax on coal which the Commission had held to be
bituminous, their holding having been affirmed on judicial review as supported by substantial evidence, it was pleaded that it was res judicata that
the coal was bituminous. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, saying that the authority of the Commission
was clear, and that the trial court had had no jurisdiction to determine the
character of the coal. This means that a tax on coal which the Commission
should find to be bituminous was valid. The decision of the reviewing court
that there was evidence that the coal was bituminous was not a decision
that it was bituminous. It merely left the order of the Commission in effect
so far as it had intrinsic force. If it were merely res judicata in the ordinary
sense that the coal was bituminous, it would not have been true that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to determine its character. It would have been
bound to determine its character, but unless in so doing it followed the decision of the Commission its judgment would have been reversible for error.
32(1938) 305 U. S. 165, 59 S. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 104. For comments oii
this case, see 39 Col. L. R. 274-9; Geo. L. J.1137-9; 23 Minn L. R. 673-5
6 Univ. of Chicago L. R. 293-6, 87 U. of P L. R. 346-8, 25 Va. L. R. 725-9;
48 Yale L. J. 879-87
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court therefore held, correctly it seems on principle, and conclusively as to the law of Illinois, that the validity of an invalid decrec
is not res judicata between the parties to it. The act of Congress
which requires state courts to give faith and credit to federal
judgments only requires a state court to treat a federal judgment
as it would treat a similar judgment of its own state. Hence the
Illinois court concluded that it was not bound to give faith and
credit to what it believed to be an invalid judgment, and affirmed
the judgment against the guarantor. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States the judgment was reversed on the
ground that whether or not the original decree was valid ("whether
or not power to deal with the particular subject matter was strictly
or quasi jurisdictional"), at any rate Congress had intended to
empower the court, when its authority was challenged, to act according to what it reasonably believed its statutory authority to be,
so that the discharge of the guarantor, having been affirmed when
challenged, was valid, even assuming that Congress 1ad not intended the court to make it. 'Mr. Justice Reed said. "* * * effect as
res judicata (i.e as matter validly adjudged) is to be given the
federal order, if it is concluded it was an effective (i.e. valid)
judgmlent in the court of its rendition. The problem before the
Supreme Court of Illinois was not one of full faith and credit (i.e.
of the effect to be given to a judgment deemed invalid) but of
res judicata, (i.e. of the validity of the judgnent)." The federal
question, he said, was as to "the power of the federal courts" where
rights are claimed under a valid statute. Though a court does not
have jurisdiction over matters beyond the scope of its authority
"there must be admitted, however, a power to interpret the
language of the jurisdictional instrument." (i.e., validly to make
judgments reasonably deemed authorized.) It was further said
that to penmt other courts to treat the judgment as valid or void
according to their agreement or disagreement with the statutory
interpretation made by the court in which it was rendered would
produce uncertainty and give no warrant of correctness. This
meant that the judgnent should be treated for all purposes as valid,
that is, that it was valid. The case necessarily holds that the judgment was valid because its validity was the only question before
the court. For res judicata, in the sense of a rule which excludes
evidence to show the truth is, in a state court, matter of state law,
and the Illinois court had held that by the law of Illinois the parties were at liberty to give evidence of the truth, and to show
that fhe judgment was invalid, if it really were so. The only error
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in federal law that the Illinois court committed was in holding
that the judgment was invalid when by federal law it was valid.
In Chicot County Drainage District v Baxter Bank," the
District was sued on its bonds in a federal court. It pleaded that
by the decree of a bankruptcy court it had been discharged of
liability, and that its non liability was consequently "res judicata."
The trial court held the plea bad on the ground that the discharge
was invalid since in the Ashton case the Supreme Court had
held that the act of Congress which purported to authorize the
discharge was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment.
Mr Chief Justice Hughes cited the case of McCormick v Sullivan"'
in which a federal decree was held to be valid though it did not
show diversity of citizenship, and said that the federal courts have
"authority to determine" whether they have "jurisdiction" (i.e.
power) to enforce a de facto act of Congress. The bankruptcy
court therefore "had the authority to pass upon its own jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction against attack, while
open to direct review, is res judicata (i.e. matter validly adjudged) in a collateral action. Stoll v. Gottlieb was cited as
authority for this statement and was said to make it free from
doubt. It was then said that it made no difference that
there had been no attack on the decree in the court that made
it, and that its assumption of jurisdiction was acquiesced in.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes did not say that the decree was res
judicata merely as between the parties to it. He said that the court
had authority to determine its jurisdiction and-that its decree could
not be attacked except on appeal. His argument was that the act
of Congress that purported to confer jurisdiction was not a
nullity, that the case arose under a de facto law of the United
States, and that a judgment enforcing it was valid though erroneous. The citation of Stoll v. Gottlieb as conclusive authority shows
that that was what he meant, because otherwise it is not in point.
And in the later case of Jackson v. Irmng Trust Company" Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes cited both the Stoll and Chicot cases to the
point that "the jurisdiction of the District Court attached when
the suit was brought" and "the court was authorized to determine"
the issues.
The Chicot case seems therefore to have been treated as like
33(1940) 308 U. S. 371, 60 S. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329, rehearing denied,
309 U. S. 695, note 5 supra.
34(1825) 10 Wheaton 192, 23 U. S. 192, 6 L. Ed. 300.
35Supra, footnote 30.
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a case where Congress had levied an invalid tax on exports and a
court, thinking the tax valid, had entered a money judgment for
its amount. But there is a vital difference. The Constitution does
not forbid money judgments. According to the Ashton case, it does
forbid a federal discharge of a state municipality.
If, as the Restatement assumes, the Supreme Court, in the
Chicot case; held unanimously that a judgment which the Constitution made invalid was res judicata of its validity between the parties, it is strange indeed that on the same day the same judges
unanimously held in Kalb v. Fcuerstetn0 that a judgment which
Congress made invalid could not be res judicata between the
parties because the act -of Congress, like the Constitution, was the
supreme law of the land. And that in so holding they should cite
the Chicot case together with Stoll v. Gottlieb in illustration of the
point that the judgment of "a court of competent jurisdiction" is
in general not subject to collateral attack, although a limitation on
a court's jurisdiction may make its acts "nullities."
In the Chicot case it was said. "The lower federal courts ***
are courts with authority * * * to determine whether or not they
have jurisdiction to entertain the cause and for this purpose to
construe and apply the statute under which they are asked to act."
It was also said "The court has the authority to pass on its own
jurisdiction and its decree sustaining jurisdiction * * * is res
judicata in a collateral action." The statement is true as to the
ground of action, but it is inapplicable to the procedure or the
remedy. It was the validity of the remedy that was in question.
Probably Mr. Chief Justice Hughes would have agreed that if
Congress prescribed for crime a cruel and unusual punishment,
the provision forbidding its infliction would have cut down the
"authority" of the court to impose it, and that its sentence would
be void. And so it must be if an act-of Congress, purports to
authorize a trial without jury, a decision by tossing a coin if evidence is balanced, ordering a bankrupt to work out his debts as
servant to creditors, enjoining the expression of opinion on a
matter of public concern, or taking private property for public
use without compensation. A federal discharge of a state mumicipality from debt stands on the same footing, if the Constitution
puts it beyond federal power. And if the court's statement means,
as the Restatement understands it to mean, that such a decree
though invalid estops the party to assert its invalidity, the Restatement itself treats it true only in cases where it is good policy to
36Supra, footnote 4.
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give partial effect to a judgment that the lawmakers have made
void of effect.
There is a sense in which every court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction. If it dismisses a suit for lack of jurisdiction,
the suit is effectually dismissed. Thereupon it may become res
judicata between the parties that as to suing in that court on that
cause the power-liability relation does not exist between them, so
as to furnish a defense to a second suit. But a court determines
that it has jurisdiction at its peril. A decision that it has power to
make a valid judgment does not give power to make a valid judgment. The cases which hold that federal courts may make valid
judgments in cases they find to be between citizens of different
states, or to fall within the meaning of a valid act of Congress, have
no application where the question is whether the Constitution cuts
down the power of the court to give a remedy There is no
difference between a provision that says that the power of the
United States shall not extend to discharging a state municipality
from its debts, and a provision that says that no federal discharge
shall have the effect of discharging it.
That a judgment unconstitutional in what it decrees must be
invalid in the same sense and to the same degree as a statute tinconstitutional in what it ordains may appear from a consideration
of the nature of judgments.
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENTS

The entering of a judgment, though not a legislative act within
the meaning of a constitutional grant of legislative as distinguished
from judicial power, is legislative in its effect, because it creates
3A

judgment of a district court, unconstitutional in what it decrees.

can in a strict sense gain no validity by being affirmed on appeal in the
Supreme Court. The affirmance will create a precedent binding all courts to
treat it and other like judgments as valid, but cannot make it really valid.
The force of the precedent will be at an end if in a later case the Supreme
Court overrules its former decision and holds such a judgmeiit to be a
nullity. And overruling -it will establish by the force as a precedent of the
overruling decision that the former judgment, though affirmed by error,
was really invalid. Thus if, pursuant to statute, it is decreed that a bankrupt
must work out his debts as his creditors' slave, and the decree is affirmed,
but in a later case that decision is overruled and a similar judgment reversed, the decree must now by force of precedent be held to be invalid and
not to be continued in execution without further direction from the Supreme
Court. This does not apply to an illegal method of reaching a result
legitimate in itself. If a man were sentenced to imprisonment for crime
upon a conviction reached by tossing a coin, the affirmance of the judgment
would seem to make the sentence valid, for its substance is within governmental power.
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a-new right, -or sometines extinguishes an old right. It differs from
the alteration of rights by the legislature in that the new situaion
brought into existence by the judgment is created merely by way
of enforcing a right which the court determines to be already
in existence. A legislature creates rights because it thinks it desirable that the rights should exist. A court can create a right
only when the conditions exist on which the constitution and
legislature have effectively authorized it to do so. These conditions
usually are that certain facts shall exist and that the court shall
determine !hat certain other facts exist. Unless forbidden by the
constitution, a legislature may grant a divorce, 8 or, on terms,
release an insolvent from his -debts. If it prefers, it may confer
on persons ingeneral a right under prescribed conditions to have a
divorce or a release from debt, and vest a court with power to
bring about the divorce or release on its determination that the
prescribed conditions exist. But the entry of the decree, as distinguished from the adjudication that the facts on which it is based
exist, is a thing of the -same nature as would be the passing of a
statute that purported to bring about the same result. Regarded
as a result to be accomplished, it is plain that if Congress cannot
by special act dissolve a marriage between residents of a state or
discharge a state municipality from debt because the subject matter
is beyond its granted powers, it cannot by delegating the power to
a court to be exercised on prescribed conditions itself empower its
delegate to make an effective discharge. Any power the court can
have must come from something in the Constitution relating to the
judicial, as idistinguished from the legislative, power, and if the
constitutional limitation is applicable to the judicial power the
court cannot possess it.30 According to the Ashton case, the reason
zSMaynard v. Hill, (1888) 125 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654.
39
That an entry of judgment is legislative in nature is in most cases obscured by the fact that it is for damages or specific performance, and seems
to do little, if anything, more than to reiterate a liability for damages or a
duty to act that already exists. Yet even such a judgment creates a new
right-duty relation not identical with the relation on whMch it is based. A

judgment in tort or contract may include an added liability for costs and
extinguish the claim on which it is founded. And it is evident that a murderer owes no duty to the state.to hang himself. A creditor owes no duty

to release an insolvent debtor. A husband who has given his wife cause for
divorce owes no duty and has no power to release her from the marriage
bond. A petition in bankruptcy or divorce does not ask for an enforcement
of obligation, but for a release from or alteration of obligation. A court is
powerless to give such relief except through action by the legislature which
shall be effective in conferring power upon it. If the Constitution, expressly
or by implication, withholds from Congress power to discharge a state
municipality from debt, no act of Congress can of itself empower a court to

make a decree which shall be effective as a discharge in fact.
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for withholding from Congress power to free state municipalities

from debt is that its exercise would interfere with the control of
their own affairs which the Constitution is believed to intend to
reserve to the states. This shows that the limitation applies to the
federal government as a whole and therefore to the courts.
A situation like that resulting from the extension of the bankruptcy act to state municipalities would arise if Congress should
amend a law authorizing courts of the United States to grant
divorces to citizens of the District of Columbia by adding that
they might also divorce citizens of states. A divorce granted by
Congress itself to citizens of a state who petitioned for it could not
really end their marriage, and a federal court's decree of divorce.
though unappealed from, could not end it. If Congress. lacking
power to discharge state citizens of the obligations of marriage,
cannot empower a federal court to discharge them, no more, if it
lacks power to discharge a state drainage district from debt, can it
empower a federal court to discharge it. The district remains indebted and it is the duty of its officers under state law to pay its
debts as it was before. They would be subject to state compulsion
to pay, or to discipline for not paying, as if the decree had not
been entered. On no sound principle can a decree which is without
effect in itself become effective by obliging other courts to treat
it as if it had effect.

In Frank v. Manguin,40 a conviction alleged to have been
obtained by a trial so unfair as to be inconsistent with due process
was upheld in habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that an
appellate court had supplied due process by concluding after careful review that the trial had been fair, but there was no hint that
the trial court's tacit determination in sentencing the prisoner after
trial that the trial had been fair made the sentence valid or made
its fairness or validity in any sense res judicata. If it did not, it is
hard to see how entering the decree that purported to extinguish
the debts of the Chicot District could extinguish them or make
it res judicata that they had been extinguished.
When the Constitution says that slavery shall not exist, that
cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted, and that
powers not granted are reserved, it uses three ways of expressing
similar results. It makes no difference as to federal power whether
the Constitution says that slavery shall not exist, that the status
of slavery shall not be imposed, or that power to impose it is not
40('1915) 237 U. S. 309, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969.
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granted or is reserved. So too if the Constitution says in words or
by implication that power to discharge a state municipality from
-debt is reserved or is not granted, it is the same thing as if it said
that no such discharge shall be granted, and that if granted, freedom from debt shall not thereby be brought about.
Titus Oates, being convicted of perjury in swearing away men's
lives, and not of homicide, could not be condemned to death. He
was sentenced to be whipped at the tail of a cart once a fortnight
from Newgate to Tyburn and back, presumably in the belief that
he could not survive many such whippings. The validity of the
sentence, even if imposed in good faith, would have to be judicially
determined, but is it true that "As the question of validity was
one which had to be determined by a judicial decision, if determined at all, no reason appears why it should not be regarded as
determinable by" the court that imposed it, "like any other question affecting its jurisdiction?" If not, why is it true of a judgment
that assumes to deprive a man of his property in municipal bonds?
A member of a legislature or of an administrative board is as
competent to decide matters of law or fact as if he were a judge.
He would not acquire learning or wisdom merely by being elevated
to the bench. If action of a court in excess of federal power is held
to be valid, or to save litigation is held to create an estoppel to deny
its validity, merely because the body that took the action believed
that it would be valid, it remains to be seen whether the same
principle will be a'pplied to prevent attack on a rate regulation as
confiscatory which a commission after hearing has believed to be
amply remunerative, or to require courts to treat as valid a statute
which a legislature, after giving persons interested an opportunity
to be heard, has decided to be -within its power to pass. Such a
doctrine might save judges so much trouble as almost to compensate them for loss of prestige as the ultimate guardians of constitutional liberty.
Section 10 of the Restatement of Judgments appears to have
little support in reason, precedent or legal analogy. Nothing indicates that it is generally law in the United States.

